Abstract
Introduction
Cooperation is the intrinsic demand of wireless sensor networks (WSNs), which mainly depends on relaying of multiple sensors. Recently, there appear many researches on cooperative communication for WSNs with different aims like decreasing of transmission delays, data-packet loss, energy consumption, and error rate, improvement of bandwidth efficiency, etc [1] [2] [3] [4] . We are motivated to seek energy-saving for WSNs through cooperative communication.
A key advantage of cooperative transmission is the increase of the received power at the receiving nodes. It decreases the bit error probability, and thus sender can use smaller transmission power for the transmission. Moderate cooperative communication is proved to be energy-efficient. But cooperation itself needs to consume energy. Excessive cooperation will cover the advantage of energy-saving that it brings. We introduce game theory and try to seek balance in cooperation and selfish behavior of nodes. Actually, the selfishness of WSNs is not emphasis. We just provide a solution to select cooperative nodes for energy-saving, which resorts to a supposing characteristic of selfishness on sensor nodes. So far research papers discussed the selection of cooperative nodes mainly according to operation experience on certain testbed, simulations, or through the factors like remaining energy and position of nodes, or just randomly [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . We address this problem from combinatorial optimization game. Through a cost sharing game, cooperative nodes are decided in the computing of optimal energyefficient routing solution. The realization of optimal routing algorithm along with performance analysis for specific WSN is beyond our discussion.
The question is who will participate in the cooperative transmission and how about their cost for this action. Nodes encounter such a challenge that they require for an efficient routing solution in data transmission while keep the transmission cost of energy consumption minimize. Clustering mechanism is often adopted in cooperative transmission. It can localize the route set up within the cluster and thus reduce the size of the routing table stored at the individual sensor node. Clustering can also preserve bandwidth since it limits the range of node interactions and avoids redundant exchange, which will finally save energy consumption. Here we propose a bi-directional multi-to-multi cooperative cluster model for an energy-efficient routing. In such clusters, nodes should make independent decision on how to distribute the multi-to-multi transmission cost fairly. Cost-sharing game as a classic cooperative game in economic theory concerns on cost and embodies the idea of economic and fairness [8] [9] [10] .
Suppose each node is selfish, despite the fact that WSNs need cooperation in nature. And there is common information nodes wish to obtain from certain source for successful transmission. It can be viewed as the utility of each node and is private information of node itself. Sensors may conceal their true willingness to pay for the service, as it may bring them less charge. Then the cost-shares will be difficult to compute. In game theory, an asymmetric game where players have private information is said to be strategyproof (or truthful) if there is no incentive for any of the players to lie about or hide their private information from the other players. A strategyproof mechanism with robustness to resist in node collusion is group strategyproof. To realize group strategyproof, a cross-monotonic cost sharing is necessary. Intuitively, cross-monotonicity requires that the price charged to any individual in a group decreases as the group expands, and vice versa [8, 11] .
But a cross-monotonic cost sharing scheme is hard to compute. In an energy-efficient routing solution, we require the energy can be recovered and the cost is moderate, which correspond to budgetbalance and efficiency respectively [8] . A budget-balanced cost sharing routing scheme will be such one that can compensate the cost incurred by the routing scheme. Efficiency means the cost that the node-set paid should be moderate; otherwise it may turn to other provider with less charging.
The optimal route tries to diminish redundant transmissions among clusters, which are caused by excessive cluster members. Thus it ensures the minimization of total transmission cost and then promotes the energy efficiency of WSNs. We wish to seek such cost sharing schemes that are both efficient and budget-balanced for an optimal energy-efficient routing solution. But the two conditions are contradicted to each other. We must make tradeoff between them.
The main contributions of our work include two. First, we incorporate a simplified clustered cooperation model into an energy-efficient routing scheme. Second, we design a strategyproof and cross-monotonic cost sharing scheme for the optimal routing solution in WSNs, and compute the bound of cost recovery for it.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces some related work; Section 3 presents a clustered cooperative model; Section 4 proposes a strategyproof cost sharing scheme for optimal routing solution and computes the bound of cost recovery. Conclusions are given in section 5.
Related Work
Our paper is mainly motivated from cooperative transmission and game theory. Research of cooperative transmission in WSNs has different purposes, among which energyefficiency is always a crucial one. Our focus is how to select cooperative cluster members for minimal energy consumption. Many papers devoted to this issue from various prospects like location [3] , experience from simulations [4] or testbed experiments [7] , energy [5] , or just randomly [6] .
Cost sharing game initially came from the problem of service and cost sharing, which is a fundamental example of production externalities. The original model has a set P of agents. An agent can select receive service or not. The total cost C of providing service depends on the set of agents served. Subset S of P that received service will share the cost C(S) among its agents. There are many examples similar to this problem, like the cost sharing of public investments [12] , telecommunication services [13] , or multicast message [14] , etc. [10] suggested cost sharing game for clustering, but only concerned fair cost sharing of cluster heads. Strategyproof mechanism in cost sharing is to make an agent report truthful willingness to pay. Group strategyproof is a stronger form of incentive compatibility to avoid coalition of agents to misreport their true paying willingness jointly. It is a dominant strategy and has been developed for different combinatorial optimization games through the design of cross-monotonic cost sharing algorithms, like facility location [15] and Steiner tree problem [16] , etc. We are inspired by the work of [17] and [18] , which discussed the bound on cost recovery in different conditions. So far as we know, there is no paper discusses strategyproof mechanism in WSNs for optimal routing solution.
Clustered Cooperative Model
The clustered cooperative model is modified from our former work [19] . Every node on the path may become a cluster head, which depends on its position and energy capacity. The task of cluster head is to launch the clustering as recruit cluster members and implement synchronization to coordinate their receiving and sending. The route acts as a multi-hop cooperative path based on clusters and achieves multi-to-multi cooperative communication. It will produce such a path that can be described as "having a width". The width is determined by the number of cooperative nodes within a cluster. In Fig. 1 , for example, n is the number of cooperative nodes, thus the width is n (not containing cluster head). Nodes in each cluster cooperate for data transmission. Packets are forwarded along the path hop by hop.
Our model consists of two periods as routing-and-clustering period and transmission period. In the first period, initialization is implemented. Then, a hop-by-hop clustering phase is followed, established a cooperative route. In the second period, nodes are ready to transmit. Cluster heads are in charge of synchronization within cluster. Nodes in one hop will cooperate with neighboring clusters.
Each node in current cluster receives data from each node in former sending cluster and then transmits data to each node in next receiving cluster. Cooperative nodes within a cluster are synchronized to reduce transmission contention. To avoid error packet from transmission, some error detection mechanism should be included in our model.
Figure 1. Simplified Uniform Cooperative cluster model
The MAC protocol in WSNs is TDMA-based. Then, all nodes need to synchronize in regular period. Nodes that do not receive synchronization information may fail to work normally. Thus, as a kind of utility, each node wishes to obtain the information as more as possible. Other utility include energy information of neighbors and broadcast from cluster head. But node may choose not to cooperate if it consumes too much energy, for example, the node is far away from any cluster head. Given the dynamics of WSNs, the routes in two transmissions may be different.
To simplify the clustered cooperative model, we suppose nodes are uniform distributed in WSNs, and each cluster has the same number of cluster members. There are two clusters in our simplified model as relay clusters and receiving cluster. Thus the model can be viewed as a multi-hop multi-SIMO system, which is somewhat similar to multicast communication.
Strategyproof Cost Recovery in Routing Optimization
In this part, we introduce a strategyproof, cross-monotonic cost sharing scheme, which can partly recover the cost of optimal routing in clustered cooperative transmission in an efficient way. The upper and lower bound of cost recovery is computed meanwhile.
The cross-monotonic cost sharing methods we propose underlie the relevant strategyproof and efficient mechanisms since they ensure all nodes that participate in game report the truthful willingness. Due to energy limitation, nodes may lie about their cost to reduce their payment. To avoid this problem, we need a truthful cost sharing mechanism as each node bids its true valuation. A cross-monotonic cost sharing scheme ensures each node tell the truth even with node collusion. Since cost share of any node cannot increase when the set of nodes receiving service expands, nodes are less incentive to lie on their valuation for better utility. Formally, a cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme has such property: It is impossible for a cost sharing scheme to be both budget-balanced and efficient (competitive). Also it cannot be budget-balanced as it is nonsubmodular. A cost function is submodular if the marginal cost of servicing a new node decreases as the service set expands, which is cross-monotonic and budget-balanced. In clustered cooperative model, energy cost rises when the number of cooperative nodes increases (it is possible that with reasonable more cooperative nodes the whole energy consumption in WSNs will shrink). So our model is not submodular. We then relax the condition of budget balance to be  -approximate budget balance (  is between 0 and1). The nonsubmodularity can also be derived from Shapley value, which is an approach in economic theory to distribute the total gains to nodes equitably and fairly. The amount that node i gets given a coalitional game.
where n is the total number of cluster members and the sum extends over all subsets S of N not containing node i. This formula can be interpreted as: the Shapley value charges each node i the marginal cost of service, and then averages over all possible different permutations of the set of nodes.
In our model, nodes in cluster wish to receive common information, which can be viewed as the payment; and the energy consumption is the cost. If nodes participate in cooperative transmission (need energy cost) receive majority of service information, then the cost sharing is efficient since it ensures larger probability of transmission success. This is  -budget balance. The resulting cost sharing scheme then becomes cross-monotonic and approximate budget-balance.
Optimal routing solution is an NP-hard problem; we will resolve it from another NP-hard problem as Steiner tree problem by computing an approximately optimal Steiner tree. To recover the cost paid for optimal routing in an efficient or budget-balanced way, a cross-monotonic cost sharing scheme is on necessary. In the cost sharing scheme, we need to solve such problems as which nodes will receive the service and the respective cost shares of these nodes. We begin with finding upper bounds on cost recovery, then address on optimal routing solution, and compute the cross-monotonic cost share for it. To simplify computation, we suppose our model only contains a relay cluster and a receiving cluster.
Upper bound of cost recovery
In clustered cooperative model shown in Fig. 1 , a cross-monotonic cost recovery cannot be perfectly budget-balanced because multi-to-multi transmission mode restricts the cost recovery. We can reconsider the model. Suppose each node has the same transmission radius as r. We regulate the cooperative nodes in the following discussion do not contain cluster head. Thus the final cost recovery only concerns to cooperative cluster members. We now pick out several typical nodes to show the cost recovery. To simplify the problem, we set the model only contains two clusters. Assume the unit cooperative cost is equal to 1. Cooperative cost of each node will be higher with less cooperative nodes (cooperative node has function of task sharing). The source node s has transmission cost c(s) =x, and the cooperative nodes in each cluster u i (i=1,2…,N) has the same cost with s as c(u i ) =x. These cooperative nodes are distributed along the circumference of s's transmission range. Let u k the fix cooperative node, and choose other two cooperative nodes as u i and u j such that the three nodes subtends an angle of (120- )° for 0   (see Fig. 2 ). Then arrange a receiving cooperative node in next cluster as n i at the position outside of s's transmission range and in the interest point of transmission area of u i and Truthful Cost sharing for Optimal Energy-Efficient Routing Solution in Clustered Wireless Sensor Networks Ling Tan, Huiqiang Tang, Zijia Zhang, Jing Ming Xia u j . It is obvious that n i is within the transmission area of all cooperative nodes of first cluster between u i and u j . The number of non-cluster head (non-CH) cooperative nodes is:
Here, w must be larger than 2 to maintain the scale of cluster.
To compute the budget-balance ratio, select an arbitrary cooperative node n' in the second cluster close to other w cooperative nodes, label it as the target cluster  (it has N+1 nodes). Denote the set consisting of n' and the other w-1 nodes in  as A, and set of w nodes \ { '} n  as B. Since  is selected arbitrarily, without lose of generality, we bound the cost share of each non-CH cooperative node as:
The inequality in ( 
Lower bound of cross-monotonic cost shares for optimal routing solution
An energy-efficient optimal routing should ensure the minimal energy cost in WSNs. To compute an optimal routing solution in clustered cooperative WSNs, we resort to minimal Steiner tree for efficient clustered cooperative transmission. The Steiner tree problem named after Jakob Steiner is a problem in combinatorial optimization [20] . As an NP-complete problem, Steiner tree problem has application in network design. We use it to solve the minimal cost of optimal routing solution. We design a scheme to distribute the cost of the Steiner tree among cooperative nodes in a cross-monotonic fashion. A linear programming based primal-dual algorithm is adopted to construct the optimal routing solution and to compute the crossmonotonic cost shares. The optimal routing in clustered WSNs produces minimal cost of energy consumption. We will solve the problem through computing the minimal Steiner tree as a linear integer programming. We still use our clustered model and the properties described above. Define a binary function f: 2 {0,1 } P  , where P is the set of all nodes in network. Select a node set S such that for any S P  , if the connection between S and s must through nodes in ( ) v S , whose removal will disconnect S from s. Second, any node in ( ) v S must be adjacent with a certain node in S. The solution of optimal routing can be expressed as the following optimization problem as to minimize the total energy cost of cooperative nodes:
where x(u) reflects the situation of node u to relay data in the minimal Steiner tree for connecting s to node in  . When f(S) =1, the constraint in (4) ensures the optimal Steiner tree contains at least one node that disconnects S and s. If the optimal solution exists, then any node in  is connected with s. But such optimal solution is hard to obtain, because the large number of nodes in WSN will result in mass of constraints that hamper the computing of optimal Steiner tree. We solve this problem through two measures: resort to primal-dual scheme and relax the constraint in (4) to obtain the primal linearity condition. The relaxation claims x(u)≥0. The corresponding dual problem is as follows:
According to the theorem of complementary slackness in linear programming [21] , we found that when tight constraint of dual holds as y(S) =c(u), then primal variable x(u)>0. Here we define a relay node u to be cooperative if x(u)=1, and uncooperative if x(u)=0. The dual variable y(S) is interpreted as the cost to be shared in S. When y(S)=c(u), x(u)=1, thus the feasible primal solution is obtained. We can construct the feasible Steiner tree that connects s to all cooperative receivers in  through careful probe of different dual variables. The resulting routing solution from primal-dual scheme is an approximately optimal one. This result is the optimal routing for WSNs, as the cooperative nodes are decided during the computing. We next will give the primal-dual based Steiner tree algorithm for the construction of a feasible Steiner tree.
To better present our algorithm, we use a terminology as component to describe a node set that is self-connected and consists of cooperative relay nodes. A node u in component S fulfills the condition x(u)=1 or u   . If f(S)=0, the component contains source node s, and we say the component is inactive, otherwise the component is active. In the beginning, we suppose all nodes are uncooperative. Thus any component that consists of a single node in  is active components at that time, since there is no cooperative relay node to connect with s. Components set H is composed of potential cooperative receivers. We stipulate each potential receiver forms a separated component. Thus H consists of many single-node components and is active in the beginning. Let Z the feasible solution set that composed of cooperative relay nodes.
The algorithm starts with initiation. In the beginning, for u  , x(u)=0, and Z   .
Step I: growing of dual-variables. Step II: expurgation of redundant nodes. For any u Z  ,if
destroys the connectivity of s and some node in  , then remove u from Z and set x(u)=0. Check every node in Z.
In step I, potential cooperative receivers are composed of two kinds of nodes as cooperative relays (belong to node cut) and cooperative receivers (belong to  ). This step stops with node set Z contains every possible cooperative relay node to connect s with  . Different with others, we exclude nodes in  from Z, thus
. It brings convenience to compute cost shares directly, as the increase of dual variables is bounded by the uniform cost c(u). Note the facts that dual only pays for nodes in v(s). Our algorithm ensures enough dual payment to pay for receivers (each is adjacent to at least one cooperative relay) during this step. Finally, Z together with  construct a tree that connects s to  . But it is not an ideal Steiner tree. Since redundant cooperative relay nodes are contained in Z in this step, hampering the result an efficient routing solution. This problem is solved in step II, which removes those excessive nodes from Z while maintaining the connectivity of each node in  with s.
To compute cost shares of clustered cooperative communication in WSNs based on optimal Steiner tree in a cross-monotonic way, we still need to make some regulations. Let t S the node set in component S at time t. At time t 0 , component first contains receiver  , we define it as ( ) t S  . Then the cost shares will be:
where ( )
 is the number of cooperative receivers that share cost. With more receivers, the cost shares will be less. Actually, the current receivers are faster to be inactive with additional receivers. To obtain a cross-monotonic result, it is necessary to increase the dual variables smoothly in step I. We regulate that component containing s continues to increase its dual variables after it becomes inactive. Thus the dual variables of a component in step I do not stop growing when it is inactive, until for every ( ) t S      , the dual variables surpass the minimal cost sum of s and Z. Since we are aim to construct a route from source to destination, the minimal cost will change according to the number of clusters (see Fig. 3 ). In Fig. 3 , each node except s belongs to some cluster. Actually, we adopt the property of cooperative clustered model here, namely, each cluster can viewed as a node with a width. If some "wide node" is not the final receiving "wide node", then it must be a cooperative relay "wide node". The simplified clustered cooperative model contains only relay cluster and receiving cluster, thus the minimal cost of the route that dual pays is 2 (contain s and a relay "wide node", as the unit transmission cost of each node is 1). This cost will increase with more relay clusters. 
We can further compute the bound of transmission cost: 
From the above derivation, we can obtain the lower bound of cost recovery for optimal routing solution in WSNs. It is a theoretical result and we will do experiments in future work.
Theorem2: In uniform clustered cooperative WSNs, each node has the same transmission cost. The lower bound of strategyproof, cross-monotonic cost recovery for optimal routing solution through our smooth primal-dual based Steiner tree algorithm is 1/4.
Our results are only appropriate for simplified model. For multi-hop clustered cooperative WSNs, the lower and upper bound will deteriorate due to more cooperative nodes [22] .
Conclusions
Energy-efficient routing optimization in WSNs is always a hot research topic. We address on this problem from game theory with a novel perspective. We suggest the energy cost for cooperative transmission can be compensated by receiving service. It intends to attract appropriate numbers of nodes to join cooperative transmission in a wise way: nodes that are interested in service should pay for it in a sharing manner. In this paper, we compute the feasible solution for optimal energy-efficient routing, during which a strategyproof cross-monotonic cost sharing scheme is formed simultaneously. Furthermore, we obtain the bound of cost recovery through computation. Since our cost sharing scheme is group strategyproof, the guarantee of budget-balance will deprive the competitiveness (efficiency) and consequently damage the performance of energy-efficient routing. To realize the optimal routing solution, we relax the condition of budget-balance to be  -approximate budget balance. The bound of  is just the bound of cost recovery. We compute the upper bound of cost recovery equals to 2/3. With a smooth primal-dual based Steiner tree algorithm, we compute the cross-monotonic cost shares for the optimal routing solution and obtain the lower bounds of cost recovery as 1/4. These results can be taken as guidance for energy-efficient routing in WSNs. We will study this problem in our future work.
